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Abstract
Multi-message private information retrieval (MPIR) is an interesting variation of
PIR which allows a user to download multiple messages from the database without
revealing the identity of the desired messages. Obviously, the user can repeatly
use a single-message PIR scheme, but we wish for a more efficient way to reduce
the download cost. In [1], Banawan and Ukulus investigate the multi-message PIR
problem with replicated database. In this paper, we consider multi-message PIR
schemes where the database is stored using minimum storage regenerating (MSR)
or minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) codes which are classes of optimal
regenerating codes providing efficient repair when a node in the system fails. The
relationships between the costs of storage, retrieval and repair are analysed, and
explicit schemes using the MSR and MBR codes from [2], which both achieve the
optimal curve of the trade-off, are given. To the best of our knowledge, our work
is the first to explore the multi-message PIR with coded database.
1 Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR) schemes allow a user to download files from the
database without revealing any information on which records a user wants to retrieve. In
the original setting for PIR [3], the whole database is replicated among n non-colluding
nodes, which results in high storage cost, so this motivates the use of erasure codes which
means that only a fraction of the entire database is stored in each node, and this is called
code-based PIR schemes.
In [4], Shah et al. present the first work of the code-based PIR schemes proving that
only an extra bit of download is needed to retrieve the desired record, and they also
provide another PIR scheme using the product-matrix minimum bandwidth regenerating
(MBR) codes [2]. Chan et al. [5] give retrieval schemes for a general class of linear
storage codes, and discover the relationship between storage and retrieval cost in the
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context of their proposed PIR schemes, and subsequently, Tajeddine and Rouayheb [6]
design an explicit scheme using MDS codes achieving the optimal curve of the trade-off
in [5]. Later, Kumar et al. [7] propose PIR schemes that use an arbitrary systematic
linear storage code of rate > 1/2, and, interestingly, locally repairable codes (LRCs) [8]
and Pyramid codes [9], which have more efficient repair property, can be used to achieve
the optimal scheme.
As the classical PIR setting has been extended to many variations, one interesting
scenario is when a user wants to retrieve more than one record. Clearly, the user can
use a single-message scheme multiple times, but is there a more efficient way to do this?
This is the multi-message PIR (MPIR) problem. In [1], Banawan and Ulukus consider
the problem of capacity which is defined as the maximum of the retrieval rate over
all possible PIR schemes by analysing the capacity of multi-message PIR schemes with
replicated database, and give a capacity-achievable scheme when the number of desired
records is at least half of the number of total records.
In this paper, we propose the general multi-message PIR model where the product-
matrix regenerating codes is used for storage. The use of regenerating codes beneficially
reduces the repair cost when a node failure occurs in the system, hence our scheme obtains
more efficient repair compared to schemes using MDS codes. To the best of our knowledge,
[4] and [10] are the only paper that uses regenerating codes in their PIR scheme, and
our work is the first to explore multi-message PIR with coded databases. Furthermore,
we analyse the relationship between the costs of storage, retrieval and repair, and design
explicit schemes that fit the optimal curve of the trade-off using the product-matrix MSR
and MBR codes from [2].
The organisation of this paper is as follows. We recall the MSR and MBR codes,
and the product-matrix constructions from [2] in Section 2. The system model of multi-
message PIR scheme using product-matrix regenerating codes is then given in Section 3.
In Section 4, we obtain the decodability condition and trade-off analysis between storage,
retrieval, and repair costs in the system. Motivating examples and explicit constructions
of our optimal MPIR schemes using MSR and MBR codes are presented in Section 5.
We give the discussion on our constructions in Section 6. Lastly, in the Appendix A,
we propose an alternative optimal MPIR scheme using product-matrix MSR codes with
a different retrieval pattern. This scheme has slightly higher cPoP and lower storage
overhead compared to the scheme using MSR codes in Section 5, and it turns out to be
a generalisation of our single-message construction in [10].
2 Product-Matrix MSR and MBR Codes
2.1 MSR and MBR Codes
An (n, k, r, α, β, B) regenerating code [11] is defined to be a distributed storage code
storing the database of size B among n nodes where each node stores α symbols satisfying
two properties: (i)(recovery) The entire database can be recovered from the data stored in
any k nodes; (ii)(repair) If one of the storage nodes fails, then a newcomer node connects
to some set of r remaining nodes where k < r < n, and downloads β symbols from each
of these r nodes in order to regenerate α symbols in such a way that we can perform (i)
and (ii) again when another node failure occurs.
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The total amount of rβ symbols downloaded for regenerating is called the repair band-
width, and typically the repair bandwidth is smaller than the size of the whole database.
There are various repair models, but for PIR we focus on the exact repair model, where
a newcomer node will regenerate the same data as was stored in the failed node in order
to maintain the initial state of the storage nodes.
In [12], the parameters of a regenerating code is shown to necessarily satisfy
B ≤
k−1∑
i=0
min{α, (r − i)β},
and the achievable trade-off between storage overhead and repair bandwidth is charac-
terised by fixing the repair bandwidth, and then deriving the minimum α which satisfies
the above equation. Two interesting extremal points on the optimal trade-off curve are
the minimum storage regeneration (MSR) point which minimises storage overhead first
and then minimises repair bandwidth, and the minimum bandwidth regeneration (MSR)
point which minimises in the reverse order. It can be shown that the MSR point is
achieved by
(αMSR, βMSR) =
(
B
k
,
B
k(r − k + 1)
)
,
and MSR codes are (n, k, r, α, β, B) regenerating codes that satisfies the above equation.
Also the MBR point is achieved by
(αMBR, βMBR) =
(
2rB
k(2r − k + 1)
,
2B
k(2r − k + 1)
)
,
and MBR codes are (n, k, r, α, β, B) regenerating codes that satisfies the above equation.
2.2 The Product-Matrix MSR Codes ([2])
Under the product-matrix framework, each codeword is represented by an (n × α) code
matrix C which is the product
C = Ψ ·M
of an (n× r) encoding matrix Ψ and an (r×α) message matrix M . The message matrix
M contains the B message symbols. In the code matrix C, row i consists of the α encoded
symbols stored by node i for each i ∈ [n].
In [2], Rashmi, Shah and Kumar gave an explicit construction for the MSR code with
r = 2k−2, so the parameters are (n, k, r, α, β, B) = (n, k, 2k−2, k−1, 1, k(k−1)) where
n > 2k − 2 using the product-matrix framework. First, they let the encoding matrix Ψ
be any (n× r) matrix given by
Ψ =
[
Φ ΛΦ
]
where Φ is an (n × α) matrix and Λ is an (n × n) diagonal matrix such that (i) any r
rows of Ψ are linearly independent, (ii) any k−1 rows of Φ are linearly independent, (iii)
the n diagonal elements of Λ are all distinct. The rows of Ψ are denoted by Ψi, i ∈ [n].
Next, the (r × α) message matrix M is defined as
M =
[
S1
S2
]
3
where S1 and S2 are (α×α) symmetric matrices constructed such that
(
k
2
)
entries in the
upper-triangular part of each matrix are filled up by
(
k
2
)
distinct message symbols and
entries in the strictly lower-triangular are chosen to make the matrices symmetric. This
is the MSR code we will use in Section 5.1.
2.3 The Product-Matrix MBR Codes ([2])
Rashmi, Shah and Kumar also gave an explicit construction for the MBR code with
parameters
(n, k, r, α, β, B) =
(
n, k, r, r, 1,
k(2r − k + 1)
2
)
where n > r using the product-matrix framework in [2]. First, the encoding matrix Ψ is
an (n× r) matrix given by
Ψ =
[
Φ ∆
]
where Φ is an (n× k) matrix and ∆ is an (n× (r − k)) matrix such that (i) any r rows
of Ψ are linearly independent, (ii) any k rows of Φ are linearly independent. The rows of
Ψ are denoted by Ψi, i ∈ [n]. Next, the (r × r) message matrix M is defined as
M =
[
S1 S2
ST2 0
]
where S1 is a (k × k) matrix constructed such that
(
k+1
2
)
entries in the upper-triangular
part of each matrix are filled up by
(
k+1
2
)
distinct message symbols and entries in the
strictly lower-triangular are chosen to make the matrices symmetric, and the (k×(r−k))
matrix S2 are filled up by the remaining k(r − k) message symbols. This is the MBR
code we will use in Section 5.2.
3 System Model
In this section, we formally present the storage model and its retrieval scheme. Consider
there are n non-communicating nodes in the system that store a database X which
consists of m records, each of length ℓ, denoted by X1, X2, . . . , Xm ∈ Fℓq. Each record is
encoded and distributed across n nodes by the same product-matrix regenerating code
with parameters (n, k, r, α, β, ℓ) which can be written as
Cj = Ψ ·Mj
where Mj is the corresponding message matrix of Xj . Write
M =
[
M1 · · · Mm
]
,
and denote by Mi the row i of M. Hence, we can see the entire system as
C =
[
C1 · · · Cm
]
=
[
Ψ · M1 · · · Ψ · Mm
]
= Ψ · M,
and each node stores mα symbols in total. We denote by Ci the row i of C which is all
symbols stored in node i, and Cji the row i of C
j which is all symbols of Xj stored in
node i.
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We assume that in the retrieval step the user wants to download p records when
p ≤ m, denoted by Xf1, . . . , Xfp. The user submits a d × mα query matrix Qi over
GF (q) to node i. We can interpret d rows of Qi as d subqueries, and for instance d is
set to be α in our constructions. Finally, node i computes and responds with an answer
ATi = Q
iCTi . The retrieval steps are as follows:
(i) (Initialisation) The user generates an d×mα matrix U whose elements are chosen
independently and uniformly at random over GF (q). Let Uj be row j of U .
(ii) (Query Generation) The query matrix Qh is defined by d× α binary matrices
V hf1 , . . . , V hfp ,
as
Qh = U + V hf1Ef1 + · · ·+ V hfpEfp
where
Efi =
[
0α×(fi−1)α Iα×α 0α×(m−fi)α
]
.
In other words, Efi is an α×mα matrix such that Ch(E
fi)T = Cfih which is a coded
data piece of a desired record Xfi stored in node h. If the entry (a, b) of V hfi is 1,
then it implies that the entry Cfihb is privately retrieved by the a
th subquery of Qh.
(iii) (Response Mappings) Each node h returns ATh = Q
hCTh .
Let H(·) be the entropy function. An MPIR scheme is said to be a perfect information-
theoretic PIR scheme if
1. (i)(privacy) H(f1, . . . , fp|Qi) = H(f1, . . . , fp) for every i ∈ [n];
2. (ii)(decodability) H(Xf1, . . . , Xfp|A1, . . . , An) = 0.
According to our definition, (i) implies that a node i does not obtain any information
about which records are being downloaded by the user, and (ii) ensures that the user can
recover the desired records Xf1, . . . , Xfp with no errors from all responses Ai, i ∈ [n].
To measure the efficiency of the MPIR scheme, we use three metrics, namely Storage
Overhead (SO), communication Price of Privacy (cPoP) and Repair Ratio (RR). First,
SO is defined to be the ratio of the total storage used in the scheme to the total size of
the whole database which is
SO = n(mα)/mℓ = nα/ℓ
in our model, and the cPoP is defined in [6] as the ratio of the total amount of downloaded
data to the total size of all desired records which, in our model, is
cPoP = dn/pℓ.
Lastly, RR is defined in our paper [10] as the ratio of the total amount of symbols
downloaded for repairing a failed node to the size of the failed node which is equal to
RR = mr/mα = r/α
in our model.
5
4 Decodability Condition and Trade-off Analysis
From the retrieval scheme, we can see that in fact, the response from node i is
Ai = Ci(Q
i)T
= Ci[U
T + (Ef1)T (V if1 )T + · · ·+ (Efp)T (V ifp )T ]
= CiU
T + Ci(E
f1)T (V if1 )T + · · ·+ Ci(E
fp)T (V ifp )T
= CiU
T + (Cf1i )(V
if1 )T + · · ·+ (C
fp
i )(V
ifp )T .
Then, the jth response in Ai is Aij = Ci(Uj)
T + (Cf1i )(V
if1
j )
T + · · ·+ (C
fp
i )(V
ifp
j )
T where
V
ifu
j is the row j of V
ifu , u ∈ [p]. Hence, records Xf1 , . . . , Xfp should be decoded by
solving the system of linear equations
Aij = Ci(Uj)
T + (Cf1i )(V
if1
j )
T + · · ·+ (C
fp
i )(V
ifp
j )
T ,
for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d] where the unknowns are
(Ci(Uj)
T , i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d], Cfuab , u ∈ [p], a ∈ [n], b ∈ [α]).
Consider first the unknowns Ci(Uj)
T , i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d], we can see that for each j ∈ [d],
C(Uj)
T = Ψ · M · (Uj)
T
= Ψ ·
[
Ij1 · · · I
j
r
]T
where Ijh = Mh · (Uj)
T , h ∈ [r]. For the unknowns Cfuab , u ∈ [p], a ∈ [n], b ∈ [α], we know
that
Cfuab = the entry (a, b) of Ψ · M
fu, ∀u ∈ [p], a ∈ [n], b ∈ [α].
Hence, the retrieval scheme is decodable if the following system of linear equations


Aij = Ci(Uj)
T + (Cf1i )(V
if1
j )
T + · · ·+ (C
fp
i )(V
ifp
j )
T , ∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d]
Cs(Ut)
T = Ψs ·
[
I t1 · · · I
t
r
]T
, ∀s ∈ [n], t ∈ [d]
Cfuab = the entry (a, b) of C
fu , ∀u ∈ [p], a ∈ [n], b ∈ [α]
has a unique solution, where the unknowns are
(Ci(Uj)
T , i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d], Cfuab , u ∈ [p], a ∈ [n], b ∈ [α]).
This condition is called decodability condition.
Next, we will give the trade-off analysis between storage overhead and cPoP. First,
we count the number of unknowns in the system of linear equations in the decodability
condition which is equal to nd+pnα. Next, we count the number of linearly independent
equations in the system. Consider
Cs(Ut)
T = Ψs ·
[
I t1 · · · I
t
r
]T
, ∀s ∈ [n], t ∈ [d],
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so we have, for each t ∈ [d],
C(Ut)
T = Ψ ·
[
I t1 · · · I
t
r
]T
.
Since Ψ is of rank r, it has a parity check matrix P of rank n − r such that P · Ψ = 0.
So we have
P · C(Ut)
T = P ·Ψ ·
[
I t1 · · · I
t
r
]T
= 0.
This gives us n− r linearly independent equations for each t ∈ [d]. Then, for
Cfuab = the entry (a, b) of C
fu , ∀u ∈ [p], a ∈ [n], b ∈ [α],
since any k rows of Cfu would give us Mfu , the remaining n − k rows must be able to
be written in terms of linear combinations of those k rows of Cfu . This give us (n− k)α
equations in Cfuab . Hence, there are at most nd+(n−r)d+p(n−k)α linearly independent
equations in the system. If the retrieval scheme meets the decodability condition, then
nd+ pnα ≤ nd+ (n− r)d+ p(n− k)α,
which implies that
pkα ≤ (n− r)d.
Therefore,
1 ≤
dn
pℓ
·
ℓ
nα
·
n− r
k
.
In terms of storage overhead and cPoP we have
1 ≤ cPoP
(
n− r
k(SO)
)
.
This shows that there is a trade-off between cPoP and storage overhead, and in terms of
repair ratio and cPoP we have
1 ≤ cPoP
(
ℓ
kα
)
− RR
(
d
pk
)
.
This shows that cPoP is bounded below by repair ratio.
5 Our constructions
5.1 An MPIR scheme using a product-matrix MSR code
In this construction, we use the product-matrix MSR code from [2] with
n = pk + r = pk + (2k − 2),
over the finite field Fq, so the parameters of the MSR code are
(n, k, r, α, β, ℓ) = (pk + (2k − 2), k, 2k − 2, k − 1, 1, k(k − 1)).
We first start with an example to motivate our scheme.
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Example 1. Suppose that we have 3 records over the finite field F13, each with size 6,
which can be written as
X i = {xi1, xi2, xi3, xi4, xi5, xi6}, for i = 1, 2, 3.
We use a (10, 3, 4, 2, 1, 6) product-matrix MSR code over F13 to encode each record by
choosing the encoding matrix Ψ to be the Vandermonde matrix, and the message matrix
Mi for the record i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} as described in Section 2.2:
Ψ =


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 4 9 3 12 10 10 12 3 9
1 8 1 12 8 8 5 5 1 12


T
, Mi =


xi1 xi2
xi2 xi3
xi4 xi5
xi5 xi6

 .
Hence, each node stores
node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4 node 5
x11 + x12 + x14 + x15 x11 + 2x12 + 4x14 + 8x15 x11 + 3x12 + 9x14 + x15 x11 + 4x12 + 3x14 + 12x15 x11 + 5x12 + 12x14 + 8x15
x12 + x13 + x15 + x16 x12 + 2x13 + 4x15 + 8x16 x12 + 3x13 + 9x15 + x16 x12 + 4x13 + 3x15 + 12x16 x12 + 5x13 + 12x15 + 8x16
x21 + x22 + x24 + x25 x21 + 2x22 + 4x24 + 8x25 x21 + 3x22 + 9x24 + x25 x21 + 4x22 + 3x24 + 12x25 x21 + 5x22 + 12x24 + 8x25
x22 + x23 + x25 + x26 x22 + 2x23 + 4x25 + 8x26 x22 + 3x23 + 9x25 + x26 x22 + 4x23 + 3x25 + 12x26 x22 + 5x23 + 12x25 + 8x26
x31 + x32 + x34 + x35 x31 + 2x32 + 4x34 + 8x35 x31 + 3x32 + 9x34 + x35 x31 + 4x32 + 3x34 + 12x35 x31 + 5x32 + 12x34 + 8x35
x32 + x33 + x35 + x36 x32 + 2x33 + 4x35 + 8x36 x32 + 3x33 + 9x35 + x36 x32 + 4x33 + 3x35 + 12x36 x32 + 5x33 + 12x35 + 8x36
node 6 node 7 node 8 node 9 node 10
x11 + 6x12 + 10x14 + 8x15 x11 + 7x12 + 10x14 + 5x15 x11 + 8x12 + 12x14 + 5x15 x11 + 9x12 + 3x14 + x15 x11 + 10x12 + 9x14 + 12x15
x12 + 6x13 + 10x15 + 8x16 x12 + 7x13 + 10x15 + 5x16 x12 + 8x13 + 12x15 + 5x16 x12 + 9x13 + 3x15 + x16 x12 + 10x13 + 9x15 + 12x16
x21 + 6x22 + 10x24 + 8x25 x21 + 7x22 + 10x24 + 5x25 x21 + 8x22 + 12x24 + 5x25 x21 + 9x22 + 3x24 + x25 x21 + 10x22 + 9x24 + 12x25
x22 + 6x23 + 10x25 + 8x26 x22 + 7x23 + 10x25 + 5x26 x22 + 8x23 + 12x25 + 5x26 x22 + 9x23 + 3x25 + x26 x22 + 10x23 + 9x25 + 12x26
x31 + 6x32 + 10x34 + 8x35 x31 + 7x32 + 10x34 + 5x35 x31 + 8x32 + 12x34 + 5x35 x31 + 9x32 + 3x34 + x35 x31 + 10x32 + 9x34 + 12x35
x32 + 6x33 + 10x35 + 8x36 x32 + 7x33 + 10x35 + 5x36 x32 + 8x33 + 12x35 + 5x36 x32 + 9x33 + 3x35 + x36 x32 + 10x33 + 9x35 + 12x36
Recall that Caij is the j
th symbol of record a, stored in node i. Here the entire database
can be recovered from the content of any 3 nodes, and if any one node failed, it can be
repaired by downloading one symbol each from 4 of the remaining nodes.
In the retrieval step, suppose the user wants record X1 and X2. The query Qi is a
(2×6) matrix which we can interpret as 2 subqueries submitted to node i for each i ∈ [10].
To form the query matrices, the user generates a (2× 6) random matrix U = [uij] whose
entries are chosen uniformly at random from F13. Recall that V
ij is a matrix which is
part of the query submitted to node i, attempting to retrieve information about record
Xj. Choose
V 11 = V 21 = V 31 = V 42 = V 52 = V 62 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
,
and
V 12 = V 22 = V 32 = V 41 = V 51 = V 61 =
V 71 = V 72 = V 81 = V 82 = V 91 = V 92 = V 101 = V 102 = 02×2.
As
E1 =
[
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
]
, E2 =
[
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
]
,
we have
V 11E1 = V 21E1 = V 31E1 =
[
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
]
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V 42E2 = V 52E2 = V 62E2 =
[
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
]
and
V 12E2 = V 22E2 = V 32E2 = V 41E1 = V 51E1 = V 61E1 =
V 71E1 = V 72E2 = V 81E1 = V 82E2 = V 91E1 = V 92E2 = V 101E1 = V 102E2 = 02×6.
The query matrices are Qi = U +V i1E1+V i2E2, i ∈ [10]. Then each node computes and
returns the length-2 vector ATi = Q
iCTi . Write Ai = (Ai1, Ai2). Recall that
M1 = (x11, x12, x21, x22, x31, x32),
M2 = (x12, x13, x22, x23, x32, x33),
M3 = (x14, x15, x24, x25, x34, x35),
M4 = (x15, x16, x25, x26, x35, x36).
Consider first subquery 1, we obtain
C111 + I
1
1 + I
1
2 + I
1
3 + I
1
4 = A1,1, (1)
C121 + I
1
1 + 2I
1
2 + 4I
1
3 + 8I
1
4 = A2,1, (2)
C131 + I
1
1 + 3I
1
2 + 9I
1
3 + I
1
4 = A3,1, (3)
C243 + I
1
1 + 4I
1
2 + 3I
1
3 + 12I
1
4 = A4,1, (4)
C253 + I
1
1 + 5I
1
2 + 12I
1
3 + 8I
1
4 = A5,1, (5)
C263 + I
1
1 + 6I
1
2 + 10I
1
3 + 8I
1
4 = A6,1, (6)
I11 + 7I
1
2 + 10I
1
3 + 5I
1
4 = A7,1, (7)
I11 + 8I
1
2 + 12I
1
3 + 5I
1
4 = A8,1, (8)
I11 + 9I
1
2 + 3I
1
3 + I
1
4 = A9,1, (9)
I11 + 10I
1
2 + 9I
1
3 + 12I
1
4 = A10,1, (10)
where I1h =Mh · U
T
1 , h = 1, 2, 3, 4, and U1 is the first row of U .
The user can solve for I11 , I
1
2 , I
1
3 , I
1
4 from (7), (8), (9), (10) as they form the equation

1 7 10 5
1 8 12 5
1 9 3 1
1 10 9 12

 ·


I11
I12
I13
I14

 =


A7,1
A8,1
A9,1
A10,1


where the left matrix is the (4 × 4) submatrix of Ψ which is invertible. Therefore, the
user gets C111, C
1
21, and C
1
31 for record 1 and C
2
43, C
2
53, and C
2
63 for record 2. Similarly,
from subquery 2, the user obtains C112, C
1
22, and C
1
32 for record 1 and C
2
44, C
2
54, and C
2
64
for record 2. Hence, the user has all the symbols of X1 which are stored in the node
1, 2, 3 and all the symbols of X2 which are stored in the node 4, 5, 6. From the property
of regenerating codes, the user can reconstruct X1 and X2 as desired.
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node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4 node 5 node 6 node 7 node 8 node 9 node 10
1 1 1
2 2 2
1 1 1
2 2 2
Table 1: Retrieval pattern for a (10, 3, 4, 2, 1, 6) MSR code. The mα × n entries correspond to CT and the entries
labelled by the same number, say d, are privately retrieved by subquery d.
Now we give the general construction of our MPIR scheme and prove the decodability
and privacy. Recall that we use the MSR code with parameters
(n, k, r, α, β, B) = (pk + (2k − 2), k, 2k − 2, k − 1, 1, k(k − 1))
over Fq to store each record X
1, . . . , Xm, which means that
C i = Ψ ·Mi
where Mi is the message matrix corresponding to X i as described in Section 2.2, so
C =
[
Ψ · M1 · · · Ψ · Mm
]
.
Suppose that the user wants to retrieve p records Xf1, Xf2, . . . , Xfp. In the retrieval step,
the user sends a (α ×mα) query matrix Qi, which we can interpret as α subqueries, to
each node i, i = 1, . . . , n. To form the query matrices, the user generates a (α × mα)
random matrix U = [uij] whose entries are chosen uniformly at a random from Fq. We
choose, for u ∈ [p], j ∈ [k],
V (j+(u−1)k)fu = Iα,
and for others V st which are not defined above, we choose V st = 0α×α. As
Efu =
[
0α×(fu−1)α Iα×α 0α×(m−fu)α
]
,
we have
V (j+(u−1)k)fuEfu =
[
0α×(fu−1)α Iα×α 0α×(m−fu)α
]
.
For the rest, we have V stEft = 0α×mα. The query matrices are
Qi = U + V if1Ef1 + · · ·+ V ifpEfp, i ∈ [n].
Then, each node computes and returns the length-α ATi = Q
iCTi , and we write
Ai = (Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aiα).
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Decodability: The following proof will show the decodability of this scheme. We can
see that for i = 1, . . . , n,
Ci = Ψi · M
= Ψi ·


−−−− M1 −−−−
−−−− M2 −−−−
...
−−−− M2k−2 −−−−


=
2k−2∑
j=1
ΨijMj.
Thus,
CTi =
2k−2∑
j=1
ΨijM
T
j .
Consider first subquery 1, we obtain
Cf11,(f1−1)α+1 +
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ1jI
1
j = (U1 + e(f1−1)α+1)C
T
1 = A11, (1)
...
...
Cf1
k,(f1−1)α+1
+
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψk,jI
1
j = (U1 + e(f1−1)α+1)C
T
k = Ak,1, (k)
...
...
C
fp
(p−1)k+1,(fp−1)α+1
+
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ(p−1)k+1,jI
1
j = (U1 + e(fp−1)α+1)C
T
(p−1)k+1 = A(p−1)k+1,1,
((p− 1)k + 1)
...
...
C
fp
pk,(fp−1)α+1
+
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψpk,jI
1
j = (U1 + e(fp−1)α+1)C
T
pk = Apk,1, (pk)
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψpk+1,j, I
1
j = U1C
T
pk+1 = Apk+1,1, (pk + 1)
...
...
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψn,j, I
1
j = U1C
T
n = An,1, (n)
where I1h = U1 ·M
T
h , h = 1, 2, . . . , 2k−2, U1 is the first row of U , and et is the length-mα
binary unit vector with 1 at the tth position.
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The user can solve for I11 , . . . , I
1
2k−2 from (pk + 1), . . . , (n) as they form the equation


−−−− Ψpk+1 −−−−
...
−−−− Ψn −−−−

 ·


I11
I12
...
I12k−2

 =


Apk+1,1
...
An,1


where, since n = pk + (2k− 2), the left matrix is ((2k − 2)× (2k − 2)) square submatrix
of Ψ which is invertible by the construction. Note that here we in fact make use of the
repair property of the code, which requires r× r submatrices to be invertible. Therefore,
the user gets
C
fj
(j−1)k+1,(fj−1)α+1
, . . . , C
fj
jk,(fj−1)α+1
,
i.e., all the symbols of record fj with label 1 in Table 2 for every j ∈ [p]. Combined
with responses from subqueries i = 2, . . . , α, the user has all the symbols of Xf1, . . . , Xfp
which are stored in the first pk nodes. From the recovery property of the regenerating
code, the user can finally reconstruct Xf1, . . . , Xfp as desired.
Privacy: As we construct the query matrices Qi via the random matrix U , Qi is
independent from f1, . . . , fp which implies that this scheme achieves perfect privacy.
node 1 · · · node (j − 1)k node (j − 1)k + 1 · · · node jk node jk + 1 · · · node n
1 · · · 1
2 · · · 2
...
. . .
...
α · · · α
Table 2: Retrieval pattern for a (pk+(2k− 2), k, 2k− 2, k− 1, 1, k(k− 1)) MSR code. The α×n entries correspond
to (Cfj )T and the entries labelled by the same number, say d, are privately retrieved by subquery d.
5.2 An MPIR scheme using a product-matrix MBR code
As in [2], Rashmi, Shah, Kumar provided the explicit construction of product-matrix
MBR codes for any k ≤ r < n, we can construct an MPIR scheme using this code with
parameters
(n, k, r, α, β, ℓ) =
(
pk + r, k, r, r, 1,
k(2r − k + 1)
2
)
over Fq to store each record X
1, . . . , Xm, i.e.,
C i = Ψ ·Mi
where Mi is the message matrix corresponding to X i as described in Section 2.3, so
C =
[
Ψ · M1 · · · Ψ · Mm
]
.
The retrieval step of this scheme and the proof of decodability and privacy are similar to
the MPIR schemes in Section 5.1.
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6 Discussion
In this section we analyse the efficiency of our schemes in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
6.1 Analysis of the MPIR scheme using MSR codes
In this scheme, storage overhead is
nα
ℓ
=
(pk + (2k − 2))(k − 1)
k(k − 1)
=
pk + (2k − 2)
k
= (p+ 2)−
2
k
< p+ 2,
and cPoP equals
dn
pℓ
=
(k − 1)(pk + (2k − 2))
pk(k − 1)
= 1 +
2k − 2
pk
.
Hence,
cPoP
(
n− r
k(SO)
)
=
pk + (2k − 2)
pk
·
pk
k
(
pk+(2k−2)
k
) = 1.
This means that our scheme achieves the information theoretic limit as it fits the optimal
curve in the trade-off derived in Section 4. Also, as we use the MSR codes in our
construction which beneficially reduces the repair cost when a node failure occurs in
the system, repair ratio in our scheme is
r
α
=
(2k − 2)
k − 1
= 2,
which is smaller than PIR schemes that use (n, k)-MDS codes (for example, in [6]) where
the repair ratio equals to k if k > 2.
6.2 Analysis of the MPIR scheme using MBR codes
In this scheme, storage overhead is
nα
ℓ
=
(pk + r)(r)
k(2r−k+1)
2
=
2r(pk + r)
k(2r − k + 1)
,
and cPoP equals
dn
pℓ
=
r(pk + r)
pk(2r−k+1)
2
=
2r(pk + r)
pk(2r − k + 1)
.
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However, the smallest storage overhead and cPoP occur when r = k which are
2k(p+ 1)
k + 1
≤ 2(p+ 1)
and
2k(p+ 1)
p(k + 1)
≈ 2,
respectively. And we can see that,
cPoP
(
n− r
k(SO)
)
=
2r(pk + r)
pk(2r − k + 1)
·
pk
k
( 2r(pk+r)
k(2r−k+1)
) = 1,
which implies that this scheme also meets the information theoretic limit as it fits the
optimal curve in the trade-off derived in Section 4. Since we use the MBR codes in our
construction, repair ratio in our scheme is
r
α
= 1,
which is the smallest possible repair ratio.
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A An alternative MPIR scheme using product-matrix
MSR codes
Here we give an alternative MPIR scheme. We use the product-matrix MSR codes to store
the database in the same way as in Section 5.1 with fewer nodes and different retrieval
pattern resulting in lower storage overhead and higher cPoP. However, this scheme also
reaches the information theoretic limit in the different point of the optimal curve in the
trade-off in Section 4, and it turns out to be a generalisation of our PIR scheme in [10].
We first start with an example to illustrate our scheme.
Example 2. Suppose that we have 3 records over the finite field F13, each with size 6,
which can be written as
X i = {xi1, xi2, xi3, xi4, xi5, xi6}, for i = 1, 2, 3.
We use a (8, 3, 4, 2, 1, 6) product-matrix MSR code over F13 to encode each record by
choosing the encoding matrix Ψ to be the Vandermonde matrix, and the message matrix
Mi for the record i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} as described in Section 2.2:
Ψ =


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 4 9 3 12 10 10 12
1 8 1 12 8 8 5 5


T
, Mi =


xi1 xi2
xi2 xi3
xi4 xi5
xi5 xi6

 .
Hence, each node stores
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node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4
x11 + x12 + x14 + x15 x11 + 2x12 + 4x14 + 8x15 x11 + 3x12 + 9x14 + x15 x11 + 4x12 + 3x14 + 12x15
x12 + x13 + x15 + x16 x12 + 2x13 + 4x15 + 8x16 x12 + 3x13 + 9x15 + x16 x12 + 4x13 + 3x15 + 12x16
x21 + x22 + x24 + x25 x21 + 2x22 + 4x24 + 8x25 x21 + 3x22 + 9x24 + x25 x21 + 4x22 + 3x24 + 12x25
x22 + x23 + x25 + x26 x22 + 2x23 + 4x25 + 8x26 x22 + 3x23 + 9x25 + x26 x22 + 4x23 + 3x25 + 12x26
x31 + x32 + x34 + x35 x31 + 2x32 + 4x34 + 8x35 x31 + 3x32 + 9x34 + x35 x31 + 4x32 + 3x34 + 12x35
x32 + x33 + x35 + x36 x32 + 2x33 + 4x35 + 8x36 x32 + 3x33 + 9x35 + x36 x32 + 4x33 + 3x35 + 12x36
node 5 node 6 node 7 node 8
x11 + 5x12 + 12x14 + 8x15 x11 + 6x12 + 10x14 + 8x15 x11 + 7x12 + 10x14 + 5x15 x11 + 8x12 + 12x14 + 5x15
x12 + 5x13 + 12x15 + 8x16 x12 + 6x13 + 10x15 + 8x16 x12 + 7x13 + 10x15 + 5x16 x12 + 8x13 + 12x15 + 5x16
x21 + 5x22 + 12x24 + 8x25 x21 + 6x22 + 10x24 + 8x25 x21 + 7x22 + 10x24 + 5x25 x21 + 8x22 + 12x24 + 5x25
x22 + 5x23 + 12x25 + 8x26 x22 + 6x23 + 10x25 + 8x26 x22 + 7x23 + 10x25 + 5x26 x22 + 8x23 + 12x25 + 5x26
x31 + 5x32 + 12x34 + 8x35 x31 + 6x32 + 10x34 + 8x35 x31 + 7x32 + 10x34 + 5x35 x31 + 8x32 + 12x34 + 5x35
x32 + 5x33 + 12x35 + 8x36 x32 + 6x33 + 10x35 + 8x36 x32 + 7x33 + 10x35 + 5x36 x32 + 8x33 + 12x35 + 5x36
Recall that Caij is the j
th symbol of record a, stored in node i. Here the entire database
can be recovered from the content of any 3 nodes, and if any one node failed, it can be
repaired by downloading one symbol each from 4 of the remaining nodes.
In the retrieval step, suppose the user wants record X1 and X2. The query Qi is a
(3×6) matrix which we can interpret as 3 subqueries submitted to node i for each i ∈ [8].
To form the query matrices, the user generates a (3× 6) random matrix U = [uij] whose
entries are chosen uniformly at a random from F13. Choose
V 11 = V 42 =

1 00 1
0 0

 , V 21 = V 52 =

0 01 0
0 1

 , V 31 = V 62 =

0 10 0
1 0

 ,
V 12 = V 22 = V 32 = V 41 = V 51 = V 61 = V 71 = V 72 = V 81 = V 82 = 03×2.
As
E1 =
[
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
]
, E2 =
[
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
]
,
we have
V 11E1 =

1 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

 , V 21E1 =

0 0 0 0 0 01 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0

 , V 31E1 =

0 1 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0

 ,
V 42E2 =

0 0 1 0 0 00 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

 , V 52E2 =

0 0 0 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0

 , V 62E2 =

0 0 0 1 0 00 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0

 ,
and
V 12E2 = V 22E
2 = V 32E2 = V 41E1 = V 51E1 =
V 61E1 = V 71E1 = V 72E2 = V 81E1 = V 82E2 = 03×6.
The query matrices are Qi = U + V i1E1 + V i2E2, i ∈ [8]. Then each node computes and
returns the length-3 vector ATi = Q
iCTi . Write Ai = (Ai1, Ai2, Ai3). Recall that
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M1 = (x11, x12, x21, x22, x31, x32),
M2 = (x12, x13, x22, x23, x32, x33),
M3 = (x14, x15, x24, x25, x34, x35),
M4 = (x15, x16, x25, x26, x35, x36).
Consider first subquery 1, we obtain
C111 + I
1
1 + I
1
2 + I
1
3 + I
1
4 = A11, (1)
I11 + 2I
1
2 + 4I
1
3 + 8I
1
4 = A21, (2)
C132 + I
1
1 + 3I
1
2 + 9I
1
3 + I
1
4 = A31, (3)
C243 + I
1
1 + 4I
1
2 + 3I
1
3 + 12I
1
4 = A41, (4)
I11 + 5I
1
2 + 12I
1
3 + 8I
1
4 = A51, (5)
C264 + I
1
1 + 6I
1
2 + 10I
1
3 + 8I
1
4 = A61, (6)
I11 + 7I
1
2 + 10I
1
3 + 5I
1
4 = A71, (7)
I11 + 8I
1
2 + 12I
1
3 + 5I
1
4 = A81, (8)
where I1h = U1 · M
T
h , h = 1, 2, 3, 4, and U1 is the first row of U . The user can solve for
I11 , I
1
2 , I
1
3 , I
1
4 from (2), (5), (7), (8) as they form the equation

1 2 4 8
1 5 12 8
1 7 10 5
1 8 12 5

 ·


I11
I12
I13
I14

 =


A21
A51
A71
A81


where the left matrix is the (4 × 4) submatrix of Ψ which is invertible. Therefore, the
user gets C111 and C
1
32 for record 1 and C
2
43, C
2
64 for record 2. Similarly, from subquery 2,
the user obtains C112, C
1
21 for record 1 and C
2
44, C
2
53 for record 2. Lastly, from subquery 3,
the user obtains C122, C
1
31 for record 1 and C
2
54, C
2
63 for record 2. Hence, the user has all
the symbols of X1 which are stored in the node 1, 2, 3 and all the symbols of X2 which
are stored in the node 4, 5, 6. From the property of regenerating codes, the user can
reconstruct X1 and X2 as desired.
node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4 node 5 node 6 node 7 node 8
1 2 3
2 3 1
1 2 3
2 3 1
Table 3: Retrieval pattern for a (8, 3, 4, 2, 1, 6) MSR code. The 6 × 8 entries correspond to CT
and the entries labelled by the same number, say d, are privately retrieved by subquery d.
Next, we will give the general construction of our MPIR scheme and prove the decod-
ability and privacy. In this construction, we use the product-matrix MSR code from [2]
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over the finite field Fq with n = (p+ 2)(k − 1), i.e. the MSR code with parameters
(n, k, r, α, β, ℓ) = ((p+ 2)(k − 1), k, 2k − 2, k − 1, 1, k(k − 1)),
to store each record X1, . . . , Xm, which means that
C i = Ψ ·Mi
where Mi is the message matrix corresponding to X i as described in Section 2.2, so
C =
[
Ψ · M1 · · · Ψ · Mm
]
.
Suppose that the user wants to retrieve p records Xf1 , Xf2, . . . , Xfp with p ≤ 2k − 2,
which we will explain later. In the retrieval step, the user sends a (k×mα) query matrix
Qi, which we can interpret as k subqueries, to each node i, i = 1, . . . , n. To form the
query matrices, the user generates a (k×mα) random matrix U = [uij] whose entries are
chosen uniformly at a random from Fq. We choose, for u ∈ [p],
V (1+(u−1)k)fu =
[
I(k−1)×(k−1)
01×(k−1)
]
and V (j+(u−1)k)fu , j = 2, . . . , k is obtained from matrix V ((j−1)+(u−1)k)fu by a single down-
ward cyclic shift of its row vectors. For any V st which is not defined above, we choose
V st = 0k×(k−1). As
Efu =
[
0α×(fu−1)α Iα×α 0α×(m−fu)α
]
,
we have
V (1+(u−1)k)fuEfu =
[
0k×(fu−1)α
I(k−1)×(k−1)
01×(k−1)
0k×(m−fu)α
]
and V (j+(u−1)k)fuEfu , j = 2, . . . , k is obtained from matrix V ((j−1)+(u−1)k)fuEfu by a single
downward cyclic shift of its row vectors. For the rest, we have V stEft = 0k×mα. The
query matrices are Qi = U + V if1Ef1 + · · ·+ V ifpEfp, i ∈ [n]. Then, each node computes
and returns the length-k ATi = Q
iCTi , and we write Ai = (Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Aik).
Decodability: The following proof will show the decodability of this scheme. We can
see that for i = 1, . . . , n,
Ci = Ψi · M
= Ψi ·


−−−− M1 −−−−
−−−− M2 −−−−
...
−−−− M2k−2 −−−−


=
2k−2∑
j=1
ΨijMj
Thus,
CTi =
2k−2∑
j=1
ΨijM
T
j .
Consider first subquery 1, we obtain
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Cf11,(f1−1)α+1 +
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ1jI
1
j = (U1 + e(f1−1)α+1)C
T
1 = A1,1, (1)
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ2jI
1
j = U1C
T
2 = A2,1, (2)
Cf13,(f1−1)α+k−1 +
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ3jI
1
j = (U1 + e(f1−1)α+k−1)C
T
3 = A3,1, (3)
Cf14,(f1−1)α+k−2 +
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ4jI
1
j = (U1 + e(f1−1)α+k−2)C
T
4 = A4,1, (4)
...
...
Cf1
k,(f1−1)α+2
+
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψk,jI
1
j = (U1 + e(f1−1)α+2)C
T
k = Ak,1, (k)
...
...
C
fp
(p−1)k+1,(fp−1)α+1
+
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ(p−1)k+1,jI
1
j = (U1 + e(fp−1)α+1)C
T
(p−1)k+1 = A(p−1)k+1,1,
((p− 1)k + 1)
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ(p−1)k+2,jI
1
j = U1C
T
(p−1)k+2 = A(p−1)k+2,1,
((p− 1)k + 2)
C
fp
(p−1)k+3,(fp−1)α+k−1
+
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ(p−1)k+3,jI
1
j = (U1 + e(fp−1)α+k−1)C
T
(p−1)k+3 = A(p−1)k+3,1,
((p− 1)k + 3)
C
fp
(p−1)k+4,(fp−1)α+k−2
+
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψ(p−1)k+4,jI
1
j = (U1 + e(fp−1)α+k−2)C
T
(p−1)k+4 = A(p−1)k+4,1,
((p− 1)k + 4)
...
...
C
fp
pk,(fp−1)α+2
+
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψpk,jI
1
j = (U1 + e(fp−1)α+2)C
T
pk = Apk,1, (pk)
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψpk+1,jI
1
j = U1C
T
pk+1 = Apk+1,1,
(pk + 1)
...
...
2k−2∑
j=1
Ψn,j, I
1
j = U1C
T
n = An,1, (n)
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where I1h =Mh ·U
T
1 , h = 1, 2, . . . , 2k−2, U1 is the first row of U , and et is the length-mα
binary unit vector with 1 at the tth position.
It can be seen that for the first pk nodes, we obtain p linear independent equations
from node 2, k+2, . . . , (p−1)k+2 to use for getting rid of the interferences I11 , . . . , I
1
2k−2.
As we want to design our scheme to be optimal, we do not want excessive equations for
this job which is the reason why p should not be greater that 2k−2.1 Therefore, the user
can solve for I11 , . . . , I
1
2k−2 from (2), (k + 2), . . . , ((p − 1)k + 2), (pk + 1), . . . , (n) as they
form the equation 

−−−− Ψ2 −−−−
−−−− Ψk+2 −−−−
...
−−−− Ψ(p−1)k+2 −−−−
−−−− Ψpk+1 −−−−
...
−−−− Ψn −−−−


·


I11
I12
...
I12k−2

 =


A21
Ak+2,1
...
A(p−1)k+2,1
Apk+1,1
...
An,1


where, since n = (p + 2)(k − 1) and p ≤ 2k − 2, the left matrix is ((2k − 2)× (2k − 2))
square submatrix of Ψ which is invertible by the construction. Note that here we in
fact make use of the repair property of the code, which requires r × r submatrices to be
invertible. Therefore, the user gets
C
fj
(j−1)k+1,(fj−1)α+1
, C
fj
(j−1)k+3,(fj−1)α+k−1
, C
fj
(j−1)k+4,(fj−1)α+k−2
, . . . , C
fj
jk,(fj−1)α+2
,
i.e., all the symbols of record fj with label 1 in Table 4 for every j ∈ [p]. Combined
with responses from subqueries i = 2, . . . , k, the user has all the symbols of Xf1, . . . , Xfp
which are stored in the first pk nodes. From the recovery property of the regenerating
code, the user can finally reconstruct Xf1, . . . , Xfp as desired.
Privacy: As we construct the query matrices Qi via the random matrix U , Qi is
independent from f1, . . . , fp which implies that this scheme achieves perfect privacy.
Analysis: In this scheme, storage overhead is
nα
ℓ
=
(p+ 2)(2k − 2)(k − 1)
k(k − 1)
=
(p+ 2)(k − 1)
k
< p+ 2,
and cPoP equals
dn
pℓ
=
k(p+ 2)(k − 1)
pk(k − 1)
=
p+ 2
p
= 1 +
2
p
.
1The scheme still works for the case p > 2k− 2 but it is not optimal in terms of the trade-off derived
in Section 4.
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Hence,
cPoP
(
n− r
k(SO)
)
=
p+ 2
p
·
(p+ 2)(k − 1)− (2k − 2)
k
( (p+2)(k−1)
k
)
=
p+ 2
p
·
p(k − 1)
(p+ 2)(k − 1)
= 1
which implies that our scheme reaches the information theoretic limit as it fits the optimal
curve in the trade-off in Section 4.
node 1 · · · node (j − 1)k node (j − 1)k + 1 node (j − 1)k + 2 node (j − 1)k + 3 · · · node jk − 1 node jk node jk + 1 · · · node n
1 2 3 · · · k − 1 k
2 3 4 · · · k 1
...
...
...
...
...
...
k − 2 k − 1 k · · · k − 4 k − 3
k − 1 k 1 · · · k − 3 k − 2
Table 4: Retrieval pattern for a ((p+2)(k− 1), k, 2k− 2, k− 1, 1, k(k− 1)) MSR code. The α×n entries correspond
to (Cfj )T and the entries labelled by the same number, say d, are privately retrieved by subquery d.
We lastly note that the retrieval technique in this paper can also be applied to the
single-PIR scheme using MDS codes in [6] to retrieve multiple records.
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